Introduction
One of the fundamental questions legislatures deal with is how to allocate government resources between constituencies which have different and sometimes conßicting preferences. The formal rules under which this legislative bargaining process takes place are universally recognized to play a major role in the budget allocation process, both within the specialized standing committees assigned to draft legislation and within the parent legislature itself. Although no legislative bargaining model can fully capture the complex nature of this bargaining process, at a minimum it is important to distinguish between situations where a proposal can be amended many times before being brought to a vote (open amendment rule) and situations where the agenda setter exercises greater control and manages to bring unamended proposals to the ßoor (closed amendment rule).
A good deal of theoretical and empirical work has been devoted to understanding the basis for legislatures ceding substantial authority to specialized standing committees and to the impact of the amendment rules these committees adopt on legislative outcomes. One branch of the literature involves distributive models of the bargaining process, which postulate that legislative processes are organized in such a way as to facilitate rent-extraction. As a result committees are usually composed of members who have the most to gain from the committees actions, with the rules under which legislation is brought to the ßoor having a substantial impact on the extent of this rent extraction. Answers to these questions are of growing practical importance as recent years have seen a sharp increase in the application of some sort of restrictive amendment rules attached to legislation in the United States Congress. 1 Answers to these questions have signiÞcant implications for the efficiency of the legislative bargaining process. For example, Baron (1991) argues that open amendment rules tend to limit inefficient pork barrel legislation compared to closed amendment rules. Substantially further aÞeld, and much broader in its implications, Alesina and Perotti (1996) argue that open versus closed amendment rules have implications for whether or not national governments will have balanced budgets, along with the overall composition of those budgets.
Experiments provide a direct and powerful tool for investigating the differential effect of open versus closed amendment rules. In the laboratory we are able to create a controlled environment in which the only difference between treatments is the amendment rule in place. Our experiment is conducted within the framework of the Baron-Ferejohn (1989) model of legislative bargaining, which yields strong qualitative and quantitative differences contingent on the amendment rule adopted. We implement the model in terms of a "divide the dollar" game with majority rule and an inÞnite time horizon.
The present paper is, to our knowledge, the Þrst experimental comparison of open versus closed amendment rules in the legislative bargaining process. Although there have been other experimental investigations of the Baron-Ferejohn model, these have both involved strictly closed amendment rule procedures (McKelvey 1991; Diermeier and Morton, 2000) . We compare our results, where appropriate, with results from these other experiments in the main body of the text.
Theoretical Model and Predictions
The Baron-Ferejohn (1989) (hereafter BF) model is intended to reßect, in a stylized manner, the sequential nature of proposal making, amending, and voting in legislative settings, modeling it as a noncooperative, multisession game. The legislature consists of (1) n members each representing a legislative district, (2) a recognition rule that determines the standing proposal in each round of the election, (3) an amendment rule, and (4) a voting rule. "Members" can be thought of as either individuals or uniÞed blocks of legislators who have the same preferences.
The legislature allocates a Þxed quantity of divisible beneÞts among legislative districts according to majority rule, with no side payments. Each member is assumed to have risk-neutral preferences that depend only on the beneÞts allocated to their district. Preferences and legislative rules are assumed to be common knowledge, with all actions observable, so that the model involves perfect information.
In our experiment we employ a random recognition rule, with each legislator having an equally likely chance of having her proposal recognized and voted on.
BF recognize that random recognition rules are not generally observed in real legislatures, but employ it in their benchmark model since (i) some rule must be employed, and (ii) under the random recognition rule proposer power is the same for all members, so that it serves as a benchmark against which to assess more complicated recognition rules.
At the beginning of an election each member i has a probability p i = 1/n of being recognized, and if recognized makes a proposal specifying how beneÞts will
where x i j is the share that i allocates to voter j. This proposal is then the motion on the ßoor. The status quo corresponds to no allocation of beneÞts,
Under a closed amendment rule the motion is voted on immediately. If the proposal is approved the legislature adjourns. If not, the legislature moves to the next round and the process repeats itself. This process repeats itself until a proposed distribution receives a majority vote.
Under an open amendment rule another member j 6 = i is recognized with probability p j = If members fail to vote for a proposal which give them a sufficiently large positive share of the beneÞts they run the risk that in the next round a proposal will be passed allocating no beneÞts, or smaller beneÞts, to their district. If the proposed share is at least as large as can be expected from future rounds, members vote in favor of the proposal. Otherwise they vote against it. Because the legislature may not distribute beneÞts in the Þrst round, time preferences may play a role in voting. BF assume that members have a common discount factor δ ≤ 1, which reßects the political imperative from re-election concerns to distribute beneÞts sooner rather than later. Alternatively, δ may represent the probability that a member will not be reelected to office in the next round. In the experiment we employ a discount factor δ = .8 and n = 5.
There are multiple Nash equilibria for this game and multiple subgame perfect Nash equilibria. The solution concept that generates unique predictions for the game is that of stationary subgame perfect Nash equilibria (SSPE). This is a reÞnement of subgame perfection for which the strategies are time independent.
BF argue that non-stationary equilibria involve overly complex (history dependent) strategies, whereas the unique SSPE is supported by relatively simply strategies. Table 1 provides the point predictions for the SSPE with our parameter values for a legislative session that continues indeÞnitely until a Þnal allocation of beneÞts is achieved.
[ Table 1 approximately here]
The closed rule always predicts a minimal winning coalition. Shares of coalition members are determined by the proposer providing payments just equal to the expected value of rejecting the proposed distribution rather than coalition partners taking their chances in later rounds of being the proposer and, if not, being excluded from the winning coalition. Under the SSPE beneÞts are always allocated in the Þrst round.
Under the open rule, and our parameters values, the model also predicts a minimal winning coalition. Non-coalition members, if recognized in the seconding/amendment process will, of course, amend the proposal. Hence the 50% probability that the proposal will be accepted in round 1. However, given the discount rate and the number of legislators, it does not pay, in an expected value sense, for the proposer to try and buy off these votes. The share of beneÞts that coalition members receive is larger than under the closed rule since rejection of a proposal is less costly (in expected value), as should they be excluded from future coalitions voters have a chance to amend these later proposals.
Experimental Design: Experiment 1
Five subjects were recruited for each experimental session. The amendment rule remained constant within a given experimental session, but differed between sessions (four closed rule and four open rule sessions). 3 To minimize the possibility of repeated play game effects, at the start of each election each of the Þve "legislators" were randomly assigned a new subject number, which was known only to that legislator, and changed across elections (but not between rounds of a given election). The number of elections (Þfteen) was announced at the start of each session.
Procedures were as follows: First all subjects Þlled out a proposal form for allocating the $25.00. After these forms were collected, a roll of a Þve sided die determined the standing proposal. This proposal, along with the subject number of the proposer, was posted on the blackboard so that prior to the voting, subjects saw the amount of money allocated to themselves and to every other voter.
In closed rule sessions each subject immediately voted on the proposed allocation. If a simple majority accepted the proposal the payoff was implemented and the election ended. If the proposal was rejected, the process repeated itself after applying the discount rate of .8 to the total beneÞts. In open rule sessions, after a proposal was selected, each legislator completed a form either seconding or amending the proposal. If amending a proposal voters were required to propose an alternative distribution of the beneÞts provided.
Although "seconding" forms were collected from everyone (to preserve the identity of the proposer) a roll of a four sided die determined which legislator, other than the proposer, would be recognized. If the proposal was seconded, an election was held following the same procedures as in the closed rule sessions. If the proposal was amended, the amendment was posted on the blackboard along with the original proposal, and a runoff election was held. The winner of the runoff election became the standing proposal in the next round of the election. BeneÞts following a runoff election were subject to discounting, so that following a runoff dollar amounts of the standing proposal were multiplied by .8, with the total amount to be allocated posted as well. Election in open rule sessions continued in this way until a proposal was seconded and approved by a simple majority.
Subjects were recruited through announcements in undergraduate classes and advertisements in student newspapers at the University of Pittsburgh and
Carnegie-Mellon University. This resulted in recruiting a broad cross section of graduate and undergraduate students from both campuses. At the end of each experimental session four elections were randomly selected, with subjects paid the sum of their earnings in these four elections. Subjects also received a participation fee of $5.
In each session an additional subject was recruited to roll the dice to help assure subjects that the outcomes were indeed randomly determined. This subject received a Þxed fee of Þfteen dollars. Practice elections were held Þrst to familiarize subjects with the procedures and accounting rules. All experimental sessions were conducted using pencil and paper. Copies of the instructions are posted on the web site http://www.econ.ohio-state.edu/kagel/fklinstructions.pdf.
Results from Experiment 1
We report results in terms of a series of conclusions. This is followed by the data supporting the conclusions reached. Nevertheless, the failure rate under the open amendment rule was much lower than the predicted 50%. As will be shown, the proximate cause for this is that supermajorities were the norm in these elections. strategy, where the sum of two lowest offers is less than or equal to $2.00 (e.g., an offer of $9, $7.50, $7.50, $0, $1). Clearly, the $1 share in this example is similar to a $0 share, since voters receiving such shares always rejected them; see Figure 5 below. This strategy is employed in 65.3% ( The growth in the average share proposers take for themselves under the closed rule results directly from the increased frequency with which they follow the DZ strategy, which grows more or less continuously averaging 11.1% (4/36) in the Þrst two elections and 73.3% (22/30) in the last two elections. In contrast, the share proposers take for themselves, conditional on playing the DZ strategy remains essentially the same, around $10, from election Þve on (see Figure 4) . This results in the steady growth in the share proposers take for themselves, reported in Looking at accepted offers, under the closed rule the proposer takes on average $8.30 for herself, while the next highest average share is $6.62. Under the open rule the average take by the proposer is $6.21, while the next highest average share is $5.47. In both cases, using a sign test (Snedecor and Cochran, 1980) , the null hypothesis that the median of the differences between the proposer's share and the share offered to anyone else is zero can be rejected at the 1% level.
Conclusion 1
Conclusion 5 Voting patterns show a clear bifurcation, with round 1 shares below $4 always rejected under both rules, and shares at or above $5 almost always accepted. Regressions show that subjects vote primarily on the basis of their own share of the beneÞts, with minimal concern for the shares of the least well off, and for their share compared to the proposer's take.
[ Figure 5 approximately here] 
where 1 {·} is an indicator function that takes value 1 if the left hand side of the inequality inside the brackets is greater than or equal to zero and 0 otherwise.
Explanatory variables include own share (s it ), DZ an indicator variable taking value one if the DZ strategy is on the ßoor, and the share the proposer takes (PS).
(Since the DZ strategy did not take the ßoor in the open rule an indicator variable for SZ is included.) The equation is estimated using a random effects probit, with a one way subject error component for all rounds. The sign of the coefficient (presented in Table 2 ) for own share is positive, large in value relative to the other coefficients, and statistically signiÞcant in both treatments. The coefficients for both the DZ and SZ strategies, and for proposers share (PS), do not achieve statistical signiÞcance. The implication is that subjects are primarily voting out of concern for their own share of the beneÞts with limited concern for the shares of the least well off and for proposer's share. 6
[ Table 2 approximately here]
Conclusion 6 Seconding and amending patterns in the open rule sessions followed the voting pattern reported in Figure 5 . Further, when proposing amendments, the two worst off voters typically receive increased shares.
Any time a voter was allocated a share of less than $4 they chose to amend the round 1 proposal (35/35 cases). In contrast, in 45.0% (9/20) of the cases where a voter was allocated $4.00, they voted to second the motion, and offers greater than $4.00 and less than $5.00 were almost always seconded (94.3% of all cases;
33/35), as were offers of more than $5 (seconded 98% of the time; 100/102). 7
Further, when proposing amendments, in all but one instance, amenders offered the two worst off subjects improved shares (typically, themselves and one other subject). Subjects were not immediately successful in creating amendments that would win a runoff election: in the Þrst Þve elections only 53.3% offered improved shares to at least two other voters beside themselves. However, they learned to create more successful amendments with improved shares offered to at least two other voters 84.2% of the time in the last Þve elections.
Discussion of Results from Experiment 1
The results of Exp. Given the large adjustments in behavior under the closed rule it may well be that with more elections play would move closer to the SSPE. Further, it is clear that it is a lot easier, and less risky, for a proposer to recognize that they can give zero shares to a minority of voters under the closed rule than to Þne tune shares within a minimal winning coalition. Exp. 2 explores these possibilities.
Experimental Design: Experiment 2
Two basic changes were made in the procedures for Exp. 2 in an effort to see if play would converge closer to the SSPE under the closed rule. First, the number of elections was increased from 15 to 25 to give play more time to evolve. Second, we attempted to speed up the learning/adjustment process as follows: Each experimental session employed six subjects, Þve student "legislators", as before, and a sixth legislator, an economics graduate student, who, it was announced, "has been instructed to make proposals and to vote according to a computer algorithm." The computer algorithm called for maximizing the proposer's share from the following two alternatives: (i) a proposal of ($10, $8.00, $7.00, $0, $0, with the proposer's amount listed Þrst) 16 or (ii) take the highest proposal passed to date, add $2 to the proposer's share, give equal shares to two coalition members, and zero shares to the two non-coalition members. 17 As a voter, the graduate student approved any proposal that gave her a share at least as large as the SSPE (0.16) and voted against any smaller share. The nature of the computer's strategy, and who the graduate student was, were not announced. 18
With the "computer" in the mix we stood a good chance of having proposals reach the ßoor that came closer to the SSPE than any proposal in Exp. 1. The fate of such proposals, whether they were accepted or rejected, and if accepted, whether other voters would make similar or more extreme proposals, should provide insight into the likelihood of play ever converging, on its own, to the shares predicted within minimal winning coalitions under the SSPE.
Payments were made for six elections, selected at random at the end of the session. As before an additional subject was recruited to act as dice roller for all random decisions. Three sessions were conducted using inexperienced subjects drawn from the same subject population as Exp. 1.
Results of Experiment 2
The main results from Exp. 2 can be summarized as follows:
1. After the Þrst Þve elections, 85% (51/60) of all proposals were passed in round 1 in Exp. 2 compared to 100% (35/35) in Exp. 1. These rejections were largely the result of "computer" generated proposals at (or close to) the SSPE (three such cases with DZ allocations and $4 or $4.50 allocations to coalition members), and a number of cases (four) where subjects' own proposals gave more to the proposer than had typically been observed in Exp. 1. Estimates from the voting equation (1) for Exp. 2 reported in the last column of Table 2 show that own share is the dominant factor inßuencing voting for or against a proposal (accounting for 92% of the variance explained in the data), with
proposers' share having a negative, and statistically signiÞcant, impact on the probability of voting for a proposal (p < .10). 21 Pooling the closed rule data from
Exp. 1 with the data from Exp. 2, and adding a dummy variable to the voting equation (1) to distinguish between the two data sets, indicates that we can not reject a null hypothesis that voting patterns are the same at anything approaching conventional signiÞcance levels. 22 We do note, however, that in the three elections in Exp. 2 in which the computer proposed the SSPE allocation or close to it, none of the coalition members voted in favor of the proposed allocations.
Conclusion 7 Exp. 2 shows somewhat closer conformity to the SSPE than Exp.
1 in that proposers take larger shares and there is increased frequency of DZ (and strict DZ) allocations, and virtual elimination of ES allocations. However, proposed allocations are still substantially more equal than the SSPE predicts, and in the three elections closest to the SSPE allocation, coalition members all rejected the small shares provided.
Discussion of Results from Experiment 2
The rejections of $4.00-$4.50 shares in Exp. 2 associated with the SSPE (or near SSPE) allocations implies that play has little if any chance of converging to the SSPE on its own, as these proposals have essentially no chance of receiving a majority vote. As such it is highly unlikely that they would be proposed often enough to get voters to accept such small shares (see, for example, Roth and Erev, 1995) . This still leaves the possibility of convergence close to the SSPE; e.g., a $15, What is left unexplained from Exp. 2 is the relative role of more elections versus the "computer" proposals in pushing play closer to the SSPE. Over the Þrst Þfteen elections there are minimal differences in the frequency of DZ play and in shares proposers take for themselves between the two experiments, so the existence of the computer proposals appears to have had no effect on these dimensions.
Where the computer proposals may have had an effect is in the near complete Instead we observe super majorities which, at least as a proximate cause, can be attributed to proposers' reluctance to ask for a large enough share that it pays to brave the 50% probability that their proposals will be amended. Instead proposers achieve higher expected returns from the more egalitarian distributions offered. In closed rule elections we observe a more egalitarian distribution of beneÞts among coalition members than the SSPE predicts. However, under the closed rule proposers have impunity from voting behavior of noncoalition members, and the additional resources that such impunity provides can be used to both increase proposer's share and to provide greater shares for coalition members. The latter increases the chances of the proposal being accepted. As a result proposers receive a much larger share in the closed rule elections, as the Baron-Ferejohn model predicts, with the institutional forces postulated as responsible for these differences playing a major role. Only the details of how these institutional forces play themselves out differ from the theory's characterization under the SSPE reÞnement.
Experiment 2 was designed to better understand the reasons why the distribution of beneÞts within winning coalitions was consistently more egalitarian than predicted under the closed amendment rule. To do this we increased the number of elections and introduced a "computer" player designed to eventually propose the SSPE. There is continued learning/adjustments in proposals in the extra elections, with behavior at the end of the experiment closer to the SSPE (i.e., increased frequency of minimal winning coalitions and larger beneÞts to proposers) than in Experiment 1. However, the results also indicate that there are fundamental barriers to achieving the SSPE as coalition members consistently reject the small share of beneÞts the theory predicts.
There are obvious connections between our results and the large experimental literature on shrinking-pie bilateral bargaining games (including the ultimatum game; Roth, 1995 surveys the experimental literature). In the latter, play consistently deviates from the subgame perfect equilibrium in favor of a more equal distribution of beneÞts between bargainers. This in turn has led to the development of a literature designed to explain these deviations in terms of arguments other than own income in agents' utility function, something commonly referred to as "fairness" considerations (see, for example, Fehr and Schmidt 1999;
Bolton and Ockenfels 2000; Charness and Rabin 2000, to cite a few of the more prominent attempts to systematically organize the experimental data). 25
Fairness considerations appear to play an important role in our game as well, with subjects primarily concerned about receiving their "fair" share of any given allocation. One prominent focal point for the minimum acceptable share in our game would be 1/n, or $5 in round 1 (Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000) . In contrast, calculating the continuation value of the game as required under the SSPE is no doubt beyond the abilities of most of our subjects. Indeed, subjects appear to rely on this minimal "fair" allocation, as shares much below $5 are routinely rejected in round 1, while shares at or above $5 are usually accepted under both closed and open amendment rules. As such, under the closed rule subjects frequently reject offers at or slightly above the continuation value ($4), while in the open rule subjects always accept $5 offers even though these are below the continuation value ($6). 26 Thus, a fundamental barrier to achieving the SSPE under the closed rule is that the rule of thumb voters rely on for their minimal "fair" share is greater than the SSPE for coalition partners. By the same token, one explanation for why play comes as close as it does to the SSPE in Experiment 2 is that the rule of thumb underlying votes is reasonably close to the continuation value of the SSPE. As a result, we would predict that factors that reduce the continuation value of the game relative to the 1/n focal point (for example, increasing the discount rate), or that complicate the game so that a simple focal point no longer exists (such as unequal recognition probabilities or unequal voting shares), will result in greater deviations from the SSPE.
One prominent feature of our results related to the fairness literature in economics is the frequency of the double zero (DZ) allocations in the closed amendment rule elections and the acceptance of these allocations. Clearly there is a strategic component to these DZ allocations as, provided coalition members get their "fair" share, they can be implemented with impunity, while simultaneously increasing the proposer's share. With these DZ allocations, both proposers and coalition members largely ignore the shares of the two worst off voters, contrary to the conclusions others have reached (see, for example, Charness and Rabin 2000) .
Although experiments provide the investigator with the opportunity to conduct direct qualitative and quantitative tests of theories where, unlike with
Þeld data, the institutional assumptions of the model are satisÞed by construction, they too suffer from well known limitations. Central among these is the use of undergraduate students in the role of decision makers, subjects who are unlikely to be as sophisticated as experienced politicians, the target population for applications of the theory. In addition, the amount of money at stake in laboratory experiments is trivial compared to the money at stake in real legislative bargaining situations, so that choices may not be taken as seriously, and subjects Answers to these and other questions form the agenda for future research.
were subject to restrictive rules, with this proportion increasing steadily over the years so that by 1991-92 66% of the bills were subject to some sort of restrictive amendment rules (Sinclair 1995) .
2 BF note that ending the amendment process once a motion has been seconded differs somewhat from typical congressional usage, but employ this representation as a simplifying device.
3 The Þrst session in each treatment had 10 elections. It being immediately obvious that play was still evolving by election 10 we extended all subsequent sessions to 15 elections.
4 These tests use election as the unit of observation. The remaining tests reported use average amount offered by subject as the unit of observation.
One-tailed tests are reported when the theory predicts a difference between treatments, two-tailed tests when there are no predicted differences.
5 All computations and estimations are performed using Stata 7. Kernel density estimates are obtained using the kdensity command and random-effects probits are estimated using the xtprobit command.
precise inequality factors at work. 10 In the ultimatum game a proposer has a Þxed sum of money to allocate between herself and the responder. If the proposed allocation is accepted, it is binding. If it is rejected, both players receive nothing. The unique subgame-perfect equilibrium prediction for this game (under the assumption that bargainers only seek to maximize own income) is that the proposers will receive all the money (or almost all of it if payoffs are discrete). These experiments typically employ stakes similar to those used here. However, the results extend to much higher stakes experiments as well (see, for example, Slonim and Roth 1999) .
offer, result in a wholesale reduction in offers to player 2 (Forsythe et al. 1994) , ruling out altruism to explain these results.
12 These counterfactual computations assume that (i) an amendment, once it is proposed, always beats the proposal on the ßoor, (ii) any proposal, once it is seconded, will be passed, (iii) a DZ amendment always completely excludes the previous proposer (which is what amenders did), and (iv) only a DZ amendment can beat a DZ proposal. This last assumption is the most restrictive, but it helps make the computations manageable, and is based on the assumption that the amender must provide at least one member of the original coalition a superior payoff to win their vote.
13
For the the open rule it is also probably much more salient that there is a 50% chance of one's proposal failing under the DZ strategy, and getting zero, compared to a 25% chance under the SZ strategy and 0% chance under the ES strategy.
14 This lack of concern for players receiving minimal or zero shares, provided own share is large enough, has been reported for three person ultimatum games (Güth and VanDamme 1998).
15 These proposals are reasonably secure as well,with an 87% probability of passing. In contrast, the expected (round 1) payoff to a proposer under the SSPE is $7.76, as $4 shares are much more likely to be rejected.
16 Alternative (i) was chosen from the more extreme, but common set of values observed in Exp. 1, in order not to give the "computer's" strategy away and to avoid possible demand induced effects. Post experiment questioning of subjects indicated that they were unable to successfully identify the computer's proposals.
The introduction of the "computer's" strategy formally eliminates the SSPE.
However, given that behavior is subject to a strong trial and error adjustment process, we have introduced changes that should push behavior closer to the SSPE, which is what Exp. 2 is designed to achieve.
17 If the computer's proposal was rejected once, it was repeated. If it was rejected twice the proposer added $1 (instead of $2) to the highest proposal passed to date.
18 The graduate student was paid a ßat fee for helping, was a classmate of the experimenters who would not stand out from other participants, and was willing and able to help out. No one inquired regarding who was following the computer algorithm, what they were paid, or what the algorithm was.
19 Mann-Whitney tests where the unit of observation is subject value data for three consecutive elections (i.e., elections 1-3, 4-6).
20 Outside of elections 4-6, when proposers ask for a higher share in Exp. 2, there are no signiÞcant differences between the two in any consecutive set of three elections.
21 In contrast, looking at round 1 votes, DZ is negative and statistically signiÞcant (p < .10) and PS is negative but becomes statistically insigniÞcant.
These two variables are highly colinear. These results are computed excluding one outlier subject. Including that subject affects the result by leaving only own share and the constant as statistically signiÞcant regressors.
population was played by computers making relatively unequal offers as well as accepting such offers. They report minimal differences between treatments where subjects were told of the computers and their strategy versus when they were not told. The minimal differences in proposer behavior over the Þrst 15 elections in Exp. 1 and 2, and the similarities in voting patterns between the two experiments, suggests no systematic effect on behavior here as well. 
